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The dark side of trust: when trust becomes a ‘poisoned chalice’. 
Abstract 
Trust is typically portrayed as inherently beneficial to all concerned; something which 
is inherently good. In this paper we focus on interpersonal trust and argue that, while 
there are undoubted benefits, trust can also be problematic; there are circumstances 
in which it can become a ‘poisoned chalice’ for one or other of the parties involved. 
We question whether the potential for negative experiences in relation to trust has 
been fully explored and argue that its true dark side lies within the dynamics of the 
trust relationship. From this stance we use the Social Exchange and gift giving 
literatures to re-appraise trust in a way that highlights the importance of expectation 
and intent and demonstrate the circumstances in which trust may not be beneficial 
for one of the parties involved. We conclude with a research agenda which we 
believe will further develop our understanding of this complex human interaction. 
 
Keywords (alphabetical order) 
 ‘Dark side of trust’, manipulation, trust relationship, trust and gift-giving, unwanted 
obligation.  
 
 
Introduction. 
Trust has long been depicted as an inherently positive experience and a 
desirable quality which should be sought after in relationships (Fukuyama, 1995). 
Interpersonal trust is considered a vital social resource that can facilitate cooperation 
and enable co-ordinated social interaction and co-operation (Brenkert, 1998a; Dirks 
and Ferrin, 2001). In short, highly normative assumptions hailing trust’s myriad 
benefits dominate the discourse: what Gargiulo and Ertug call an ‘optimistic bias’ 
(2006: 165). For, as Sievers observes (2003: 356), ‘how could anyone be against 
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trust per se? It is – like motherhood and apple pie – a good thing and a necessary 
constituent of the social fabric’.   
We are concerned that this litany has become taken-for-granted, almost to the 
point of being unchallengeable, and that trust may be seen as a catch-all panacea 
(McAllister, 1997). In 1998 Flores and Solomon observed the danger that trust was 
being oversold and we believe that danger still exists. While there are undoubted 
benefits connected with trust, we argue that its virtues are only part of the picture 
and, as with most organisational phenomena, trust has its downside. We therefore 
explore in this paper what might distinguish a negative experience of interpersonal 
trust from a positive experience. In order to achieve this, we examine what is 
commonly portrayed as the ‘dark side’ of trust, identify the limits to current thinking 
and offer an alternative view.  
Our primary contribution in this paper is to show how the particular nature of 
trust and the behavioural strictures implied in trust dynamics – the same ones which 
generate the positive experiences lauded in the literature – can also facilitate 
negative dynamics and outcomes. We argue that trust’s dark side does not 
materialise when it turns out to be misplaced, which is the most common depiction of 
negative trust experiences instead we suggest that it arises when the dynamics of 
interpersonal trust draw the focal party (whether giver or recipient) into an 
uncomfortable exchange dilemma from which it is difficult to extricate oneself; where 
the very nature of trust means that most of the options available as a response are 
neither viable nor attractive. 
Some of these uncomfortable scenarios can be unintentional consequences 
of genuine, sincere trust dynamics, but there is also the potential for those dynamics 
to be manipulated deliberately. In either case, trust can become the ‘poisoned 
chalice’ of our title; something that has the appearance of being good (beneficial, 
virtuous) on the surface but which, in reality, can lead to negative experiences and 
unwanted outcomes for the focal party. The implications of our analysis challenge 
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several prevailing assumptions governing this ‘central, superficially obvious but 
essentially complex’ concept (Blois, 1999: 197). 
The paper proceeds as follows: we first define trust and explain its essential 
dynamics. We then note the scant treatment that its dark side has received to date, 
before turning to social exchange theory (SET) and the anthropological gift-giving 
literature to provide the primary theoretical basis for our own analysis of this issue. 
We highlight several insights from these two literatures which facilitate a broader 
understanding of what the ‘dark side’ of trust means. Throughout we use vignettes 
from organisational life to illustrate when trust might become a poisoned chalice. In 
the discussion and conclusion, we consider the implications of our analysis for trust 
relationships, including for several ongoing debates in the literature regarding the 
nature of trust.    
 
Trust 
Before we can analyse what it is about the process of trusting that can render 
trust either a benign experience or a poisoned chalice we first need to understand the 
process of trusting and being trusted. Commonly the process is described as follows; 
parties to any trusting interaction (‘A’ and ‘B’) exchange small-scale concessions or 
offerings in the form of trust’s risk-taking act. Party A’s trust bestowed upon B is 
either vindicated (B elects not to exploit A’s vulnerability, fulfils her/his obligations 
competently and honestly, and possibly reciprocates in kind), in which event trust 
may develop further. Alternatively, B chooses to take advantage of A’s vulnerability 
or is incompetent in discharging her/his implied obligations, undermining trust to the 
point where it may disappear from the relationship entirely.  
In any trust relationship, there is a giving party (the trustor) and a receiving 
party (the trustee). Trust becomes salient in a situation entailing a degree of 
uncertainty and risk for one or both parties, whether the trustor or the trustee. In fact 
the relevance of trust is due to the uncertainties regarding the actions of others in a 
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situation of dependency (see Luhmann 1979) and as Möllering (2007: 8) notes this 
uncertainty is irreducible as ‘the agency of both trustor and trustee, who are 
autonomous in that their states of mind and actions are not fully determined, the 
result being that neither manifestations of trust nor the honouring of trust can 
ultimately be forced or guaranteed’ As we shall see, the inherent ambiguity in trusting 
situations is an important factor in the context of the dark side.    
Trust is therefore a process, it is not simply a psychological state, or a 
cognitive, calculative orientation toward risk (Kramer, 1999, Rousseau et al., 1998). 
This is vital for our argument. The trust process consists of three stages (Dietz and 
den Hartog, 2006; McEvily et al, 2003) beginning with a set of beliefs about the other 
party’s trustworthiness, commonly understood to comprise assessments of their 
ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995). A decision to trust is taken on 
the basis of those beliefs, summarised in Rousseau et al’s widely adopted definition 
of trust as ‘a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another’ (1998: 
395); what Giddens (1990) has described as a leap of faith. Distrust occurs when the 
trustor has confident negative expectations about the other party and, based on 
these, decides not to accept vulnerability (Lewicki et al.,1998). The final stage, 
arising from the decision, is a risk-taking act, undertaken to demonstrate one’s trust 
(Mayer et al., 1995). Such acts include increased collaboration and reliance, sharing 
scarce or valuable resources and sensitive information, and deliberately reduced 
monitoring (Dietz and den Hartog, 2006). Note that Rousseau et al’s definition omits 
the behavioural manifestation of trust, while in Mayer et al.’s model, it is viewed as a 
necessary outcome of trust, but not part of trust itself. We disagree. As we will show, 
the risk-taking act is trust’s defining stage, and the way that it is both sought and 
enacted (or not) can lead to the manifestation of trust’s dark side.  
If viewed as a process, it is apparent that trust is subject to the outcomes of 
social interactions between the parties concerned (Lewicki et al., 2006; Zand, 1972). 
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Its presence (and maintenance), or its absence (or threat thereof), emerges from, 
and defines, the relationship between parties. Fundamentally, trust is relational 
(Schoorman et al., 2007). Trust can be offered, requested, bestowed or denied, and 
the moment of the exchange is the risk-taking act. The content and progress of 
exchanges determine whether trust is positively or negatively experienced, even 
superseding the cognitions of the parties involved. Flores and Solomon (1998: 206) 
argue that trust is a ‘social practice, defined by choices’, it evolves in relationships 
and is created (destroyed) through everyday exchanges in which promises, 
commitments and the frustration of such promises and commitments occur. The 
process of trusting involves powerful emotions and values (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
These emotions are typically portrayed as positive (Frederickson and Joiner, 2002) 
such as reassurance and pride while not trusting or being trusted is associated with 
negative emotions such as anxiety or  humiliation. People do tend to prefer trust in 
their relationships over distrust (Graebner, 2009) but we question whether this 
optimistic portrayal of trust’s affective state always holds true. 
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Current views on the ‘dark side’ of trust 
In the context of human activity and interaction there are few things which are 
wholly positive yet trust’s ‘dark side’ has received surprisingly little attention within the 
dedicated trust literature. In neither Mayer et al’s seminal conceptual paper (1995), 
nor their anniversary reflection (Schoorman et al., 2007), is any downside to trust 
considered beyond distrust and trust violations. Kramer, in his widely cited review 
(1999), noted several barriers to trust but offered few reservations about the 
experience of trust other than distrusting scenarios. He has since argued, in the wake 
of the Bernie Madoff ponzi scandal, that people may be trusting too much and 
advocates practical steps for managers to be vigilant against biases that may render 
them a victim of manipulated trust (Kramer, 2009).  
Where it is addressed, trust’s dark side is most commonly linked with poor 
judgement. For example, Gargiulo and Ertug (2006) identify what they call the ‘dark 
side’ of trust as occurring when the trustor strays beyond a critical threshold of 
confidence such that her trust in another becomes inappropriate and ill-judged. 
Similarly, Currall and Epstein’s (2003) trust-derived interpretation of the Enron 
scandal notes that too many people showed excessive trust in the firm’s senior 
management. McEvily et al. (2003: 99-100) allude to trust’s ‘considerable downside’, 
noting how it can ‘lead the trustor astray and ‘may produce systemic biases that can 
result in judgements that are substantially flawed and costly’. This downside has 
been demonstrated empirically in Langfred’s (2004) study of complacent self-
managing teams, and Patzelt and Shepherd’s (2008) study of underperforming 
alliances.  
Yet, what these authors have highlighted is the possibility of mistaken 
judgement: situations in which trust may be misplaced, and hence counter-productive 
for the trust giver. This misunderstands a fundamental aspect of trust, which is that 
the possibility of betrayal or disappointment is inherent to the experience and hence 
unavoidable in any trusting encounter. Indeed, it is one of trust’s defining conditions 
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as without this possibility there would be little risk. The prospect of getting a trust 
decision wrong is certainly trust’s regrettable side, but we question whether it is truly 
a dark side, a phrase which implies something invidious or even sinister.  
We are aware of a limited number of overtly sceptical takes on trust that draw 
attention to the possibility of trust being used in a manner which does not match with 
the idea that it is an inherently beneficial experience. Gambetta (1988) was among 
the first to point to bonds of trust being problematic in certain circumstances, citing 
the powerful bond among mafiosi. As well as considering the risks from misattributed 
trust, McAllister (1997: 93) examined ‘the susceptibility of trust relationships to 
manipulation and abuse’ and ‘the tendency towards persistence in failed and failing 
trust relationships’. Flores and Solomon (1998: 208) observe the potential for trust to 
be utilised as a manipulative tool in business contexts if it is viewed as ‘a lubricant to 
make an operation more efficient’. Sievers (2003: 360-363) points to the ‘self-
deceiving character’ of what passes for trust in today’s organisations: weak, 
transient, unlikely to be genuine. He suggests that trust, like ‘motivation’ is a 
managerial ruse for re-establishing order and masking the disorder, misery and 
despair felt by many at work. He cites Hardy et al.’s (1998) case study of a plant 
closure, in which the management fooled the trade union with their apparent concern 
and candour. Importantly for our purposes, Hardy and colleagues argue that the 
managers offered an outward display of trust to mask a covert, deliberate, use of 
antagonistic power (for a similar case study, see Timming, 2008).  
These sceptical takes begin to highlight what we believe contributes to the 
dark side of trust. In our view this is not about misplaced trust but occurs when the 
trust process results in a trusting situation that is unwelcome and/ or 
disadvantageous but effectively unavoidable for one or both parties concerned. As 
we shall illustrate later, such dark side situations can arise unintentionally or be 
created deliberately as a result of ‘motivated behaviour by an employee or group of 
employees that has negative consequences for an individual’ (Griffin and O’Leary-
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Kelly, 2004: 4-5). We believe that trust’s dark side is inherent in the very nature of the 
trust relationship; it is in essence about exchange, reciprocation and obligation. 
 
Understanding trust as an exchange commodity.  
As we have noted above, trust occurs within the context of a relationship and 
strengthens or declines as the result of the exchanges which occur but it is clearly 
different from money or other tangible resources which may be exchanged. Foa and 
Foa (Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2004; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005) plotted 
exchange resources against two dimensions: the concreteness of the resource (its 
physical tangibility) and particularism-universalism (the importance of the identity of 
the giver: the extent to which who is giving the resource matters for the resource 
itself).Trust is clearly intangible; we cannot touch trust, or measure it out in clear 
quantities. In many incidences, it might not even be observable, though it is 
demonstrated through a risk-taking act. Trust is more often something that is felt or 
believed. In Homans’ terms it is a resource of ‘symbolic value’ (1958, cited in 
Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005: 890) that is being exchanged. Trusting someone and 
being trusted are acts charged with meaning – symbolism – for the relationship and 
herein lies some of the potential for the dark side. Trusting someone implies an 
endorsement of their character and capabilities, and hence their status, whether in 
general terms or within a given social network. Thus, trust as a resource is bound up 
with our identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1985) and as such has the power to create a 
strong obligation not to disappoint the trust giving party. Indeed, Tyler (2003) links 
this symbolic value of trust to status and identity information: trust signals to the trust 
recipient that (s)he is accepted and seen as an important group member. As such 
trust has the power to create a strong obligation in the recipient not to disappoint the 
trust giving party. 
Trust is also highly particularistic: the identity of the focal party is crucial. If the 
decision to trust is intimately linked to self-identity, through parties’ chosen 
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affiliations, it matters who trusts us, and who we choose to trust. The importance of 
who trusts us may be further heightened in relationships where there is a power 
imbalance such as between a line manager and employee. Intangible and 
particularistic resources are, in Foa and Foa’s words, ‘an expression of evaluative 
judgement which conveys high or low prestige, regard or esteem’ (cited in Coyle-
Shapiro and Conway, 2004: 12).   
Additionally, a number of authors argue for a profound emotional dimension to 
the experience of trust: for example, McAllister’s (1995) measure of trust explicitly 
taps this dimension, alongside the more conventional cognitive dimension. It simply 
feels good to experience the reassurance and comfort from trusting someone 
(Lewicki et al., 1998), and the pride in being trusted (Pettit, 1995; Salomon & 
Robinson, 2008). At the same time, not trusting or not being trusted can induce 
feelings of anxiety, fear, embarrassment, even shame and humiliation (Lewicki et al., 
1998). The benefits associated with trusting and being trusted, and the deleterious 
outcomes associated with distrust, mean that the process is fraught with feelings. 
Both trust and the refusal to trust and be trusted are thus linked to strong emotional 
experiences and it is not surprising that the preference tends to be for trust rather 
than distrust to be part of relationships (Graebner, 2009).  
In summary the characteristics of trust are that it is symbolic rather than 
material, particularistic rather than universal, and socio-emotional rather than 
instrumental. These are characteristics which have the potential to create and 
structure obligation within the context of a relationship and which help us to 
appreciate why trust is such a potent construct (precious and treasured, but also 
potentially onerous and difficult to resist).  
 
Trust, reciprocation and obligation: insights from SET and gift-giving. 
Since trust is relational, many authors argue that its nature is intimately bound 
up in social exchange, and vice versa (see Blau, 1964; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 
10 
 
2005; Whitener et al., 1998). The two are thought to account for the other, and trust 
is commonly understood to be realised through social exchange processes: 
‘reciprocation reinforces and stabilises trust, the axis upon which social exchange 
resolves’ (Aryee et al., 2002: 271). Social exchange is about the initiation and 
expansion of exchanges in relationships. For Blau (1964: 91) it is concerned with the 
‘voluntary actions [later called ‘investments’] of individuals that are motivated by the 
returns they are expected to bring, and typically do bring, from others’. Social 
exchange ‘involves a series of interactions [that] are usually seen as interdependent 
and contingent on the actions of another person’ (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005: 
874). Social benefits, like trust, have ‘no exact price’ (Blau, 1964: 96) and hence 
‘cannot be bartered lest their value as genuine feelings or judgements be 
compromised’ (ibid). Moreover, standard governing principles and processes for 
economic transactions – setting prices; formal contracts; the threat of sanction – may 
not be available for regulating trust, or may not be an attractive or viable option and 
herein lies further potential for the dark side. 
That said, there are a few suggested guidelines for reciprocity in the SET 
literature.  One is to reciprocate in a manner that is contingent upon the original offer 
received. The norm is that ‘an individual who supplies rewarding services to another 
obligates him. In order to discharge this obligation, the second must furnish benefits 
to the first in turn’ (Blau 1964: 89 – emphasis added). According to Blau, the person 
who receives a reward from associating with another has an incentive to furnish 
inducements that continue the association (1964: 100). Gouldner (1960) argued that 
the return must be roughly equivalent, in order to do justice to the original transaction 
and to sustain the exchange. Thus, the obligations of social exchange can create a 
bond that needs regular confirmation in order for a relationship to endure and 
prosper. Importantly, this means that the norm of reciprocity delimits and even 
instructs the likely content of the exchanges, and reinforces the enduring social 
patterns created, by constraining the parties’ options. Indeed, the norm’s powerful 
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hold on our thinking and behaviour – some argue that the principle of reciprocity is 
hard-wired into our brains (Cialdini, 2001; Carmichael and MacLeod, 1997) – means 
that resisting its implied obligations is formidably difficult. For a valued commodity 
such as trust, this could be expected to intensify the pressure of the obligation (see 
Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2004) to a degree that, we argue, can become coercive.  
Trust dynamics are commonly depicted in ways that match those in SET 
(Whitener et al., 1998) but, we would also argue, there is resonance with those 
described in the anthropological literature relating to gift-giving. Both the theory of 
social exchange and that on gift-giving usefully explore issues relating to reciprocity, 
obligation and patterns of exchange that are similarly understood to exert a powerful 
influence on people’s thinking and behaviour (Cialdini, 2001). While the norm of 
reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960; Whitener et al., 1998; Lemmergaard and Muhr, 2011) is 
important in both literatures, the issue of reciprocity has been more contentious in the 
context of gift giving where more attention has been paid to intentions which lie 
behind a gift. A contribution which we believe is particularly helpful when exploring 
the dark side of trust; in understanding the nature of these exchange relations, the 
tensions inherent within them, and the potential for negative effects.  
Most anthropologists, from Mauss (1954) onwards, have argued that gift-giving 
carries with it an implied expectation of a return in kind at some point, whether with a 
tangible object or in a more symbolic fashion (Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2001). 
However, some have stressed an absence of reciprocity as a defining characteristic 
expressed in the concept of the ‘free gift’, a gift, which is given without expectations 
of any return (Derrida 1992; Jones, 2003). Derrida (1992) has argued that a pure gift 
requires that there should be no reciprocity and no memory of a gift given. However, 
as Lemmergaard and Muhr (2011) observe, the difficulty that theorists have had in 
demonstrating the existence of such gifts serves to highlight that, in reality, a gift is 
never entirely free or reciprocal. Hence many authors in the gift-giving literature 
would consider that Derrida’s notion of the ‘free gift’ is best understood as an ideal 
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type in the Weberian sense: an ideal against which social reality is interpreted and 
measured. We would suggest that the notion of this ‘wanted illusion‘ that gift 
recipients are looking for (Ortmann, 2004) paradoxically may even facilitate gifts 
being given instrumentally with the intent of creating obligations, even to the extent 
that gift recipients could be manipulated into situations of dependency. Such an 
effect is for instance, discussed in the marketing literature where a number of studies 
show that ‘free gifts’, gifts which are given without explicit requests, are more likely to 
evoke feelings of obligation than conditional gifts and thus are more likely to lend 
themselves to manipulation (Bodur and Grohmann, 2005).  
Mauss (1954) represented gifts as ambiguous, combining both generosity and 
self-interest, suggesting that influence is carried in all gifts (Lemmergaard and Muhr, 
2011). Gift-givers who are more interested in others’ interests either seek to create 
mutual benefits or devote resources unselfishly out of a deep concern for the 
recipient (Uhl-Bien et al., 2003). Under these conditions it is suggested that recipients 
react with gratitude, which is a positively valenced emotion (Lazarus and Lazarus 
1994) and this is linked to pro-social motivation (Gray et al. 2001). Mainly self-
interested gift-givers initiate exchanges in order to obtain resources from the 
recipient, which would be otherwise hard or very costly to obtain. Tsang (2006) 
suggests that such self-interested intentions create indebtedness on the part of the 
focal party: that is, an obligation to reciprocate which may be linked to negative 
emotions (for example Greenberg, 1980) and avoidance motivation (Gray et al., 
2001). Self-interested intentions might, therefore, turn trust sour. 
In addition to recognising the pernicious effects of self-interested motives, the 
gift-giving literature analyses manipulating behaviour. Mauss (1954), Schwartz 
(1967) and Wolfinbarger (1990) all acknowledge self-interest or the engineering of 
recipient indebtedness as a possible motive behind gift-giving, seeing both tactics as 
useful for gaining, and maintaining, status and control. Sherry argues that the act of 
giving is not merely ‘a vehicle of social obligation’ but also for ‘political manoeuvre’ 
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(1983: 157 – emphasis added), thus the gift-giver may instrumentalise gift-giving 
even to the point where the gift-recipient is exploited and harmed. In other words, 
they may handle gift-giving opportunistically by misusing their power to their own 
advantage.  Blau (1964: 106-112) also saw the potential for the distribution of social 
exchange being used as a self-interested power-play.  
As we shall discuss shortly, unlike the vast majority of the trust and the SET 
literature, the gift-giving literature identifies and explores the whole range of possible 
intentions of a gift-giver from the more altruistic ‘free gift’ to the more sinister 
manipulative gift. The potential for an unwelcome and/or manipulative side of 
exchange is recognised as is the reality that, in certain incarnations, gift-giving can 
carry unwelcome consequences for the giver or the recipient (Lemmergaard and 
Muhr, 2011). 
 
Unwelcome obligations   
The gift-giving literature has intensively discussed the anxieties stemming 
from fears of not meeting the expectations of the other party (Wooten, 2000). If we 
apply this to the giving and receiving of trust we can see the potential for trust to be 
problematic for both sides. For example, a gift-giver might worry that their gift does 
not match the gift-recipient’s preferences (Camerer, 1988) or the pre-existing 
expectations on the part of the gift recipient might not match the reality of the gift, or 
the gift might not reflect the recipient’s self-concept correctly (Sunwolf, 2006). In a 
trust context the trust giver might worry that their trust is misplaced, something which 
we have argued is inherent to trust and not its dark side. But a scenario of 
inappropriately placed trust can become a poisoned chalice if requests for that trust 
are contrary to the trustee’s better judgement and create an uncomfortable 
obligation. Our first illustrative scenario explains how.  
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Scenario 1: Reluctant trust – in which Anthony exhorts Ben to trust him.  
In this scenario, Anthony’s appeal to Ben is that he can, and even should, be trusted. 
If Ben has ‘confident positive expectations’ that Andrew can be relied upon, then a 
normal and genuine trust encounter can ensue. That is not a ‘dark side’ scenario. 
However, if Ben is wary of Anthony, and/or feels that to trust him might be contrary to 
his own interests, Ben may be thought to have few ‘confident positive expectations’, 
sensing that placing trust in Anthony may be unwise. The, ‘poisoned chalice’ 
dilemma for the trust-giver (Ben) occurs because although Anthony’s request for trust 
ought to be treated with scepticism as it is a self-report (with self-serving biases and 
protected interests), social and interpersonal protocols and trust’s socio-emotional 
and status-laden characteristics can make it very difficult to reject such an appeal. A 
rejection disputes the accuracy of the would-be trust recipient’s self-assessed 
confidence in their ability, benevolence and integrity. A rejection inevitably casts 
negative aspersions on the trust recipient (especially their status) in a way that could 
be damaging to the relationship, particularly if declining the request is carried out in 
public view. Moreover, the implied slight may require a justification, which might be 
socially awkward to proffer. Thus, a trust recipient can, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, use the language and dynamics of ‘trust’ to solicit trust from a 
possibly reluctant trust giver. This feature distinguishes the scenario from the 
misplaced trust that results from an error of judgement on Ben’s part – although to 
bestow trust too readily may be seen as incompetence by others, heightening the 
anxiety around the ‘trust/don’t trust’ decision. Trust can also become a poisoned 
chalice in this scenario if Anthony’s exhortations as to his trustworthiness persuade 
Ben to develop the ‘confident positive expectations’ necessary for the trust decision 
despite his initial misgivings. 
Examples in organisations include peers being asked to collaborate with 
colleagues they believe to be unreliable or inadequate. The Anthony in our scenario 
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might be a salesperson with a reputation for dull or incoherent presentations, but who 
insists on being given the chance to redeem himself by delivering his team’s pitch to 
a major client. Another example is having to trust management statements on future 
job losses (cf. the Hardy et al., 1998, case study mentioned earlier) or claims of 
sound corporate governance practice and appropriate risk assessment (for example, 
Dick Fuld of Lehman Brothers and Andy Hornby of HBoS prior to each firm’s 
collapse). Fox observed this scenario in manager-subordinate relationships; ‘we’ve 
got to trust them’ means in fact ‘we don’t trust them but feel constrained to submit to 
their discretion’ (Fox, 1974: 95). Graebner (2009) found that many entrepreneurs 
commit to contractual agreements with investors against their better judgement, 
because of deliberate trust-inducing deceptions.  
In the trust literature, much emphasis has been placed on the downside of 
inappropriate trust for the trust-giver (Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006; McEvily et al., 2003). 
However, the solicitation of trust is not without a price for the recipient (Anthony in 
our scenario). Issuing an appeal to be trusted increases the trust recipient’s 
vulnerability to a failure to deliver on expectations. Anthony would have no room for 
error in making his pitch. Employees who consent to place trust in their line 
management, for example, form a clear expectation that those managers will protect 
the employees’ interests. Failure to meet these expectations is likely have a 
detrimental effect on levels of staff trust, and consequently on commitment, 
motivation and morale. From their perspective this may be an unwelcome implication 
for that management group’s obligations. The scenario is still of misplaced 
(inappropriate) trust because the recipient sees it as inappropriate - they know they 
can’t, or don’t wish to, fulfil the implied obligations.  
This leads us to our second poisoned chalice scenario, in which the roles are 
reversed to consider the effect of unwanted trust for the trust recipient.  There are a 
number of reasons why somebody doesn’t want to be trusted; it may be because of 
their extended reciprocation wariness (Eisenberger, Cotterell and Marvel, 1987) or 
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they may view any trust placed in them as inappropriate. Wary employees have been 
found to react to social exchanges with less affective commitment and trust, and with 
higher turnover intentions than less wary employees (Shore et al., 2009). However, 
the potential for the ‘poison chalice’ lies in scenarios when the recipients view trust as 
unwelcome, because (s)he fears that the trust-induced obligation cannot be repaid. 
This creates a scenario in which the trust recipient does not wish to be trusted 
because they doubt that they can fulfil the obligation or they do not wish to do so, but 
they find the offer difficult to refuse. 
Scenario 2: Unwelcome trust – in which Andrew wishes to place trust in Brenda but 
Brenda doesn’t want to be trusted. 
In this scenario, the trust recipient (Brenda) is informed that she is being 
trusted (by Andrew). The trust decision has been taken by Andrew, but prior to the 
risk-taking act Brenda faces a dilemma: she may prefer to decline Andrew’s trust in 
her because it communicates expectations, and possibly obligations, relating to 
future behaviour that may be problematic, but she may feel unable to do so. This 
reluctance to be trusted may occur when trustees, such as Brenda, doubt their 
capability to fulfil the obligations implied by the trust (a low self-report on their own 
‘ability’, such as weak self-efficacy beliefs) or because the pressures of the obligation 
may be intolerable (for example they may believe that there could be damage to their 
mental and/or physical well-being if they attempt to fulfil the trust-related 
expectations), or may run counter to their interests (Flores and Solomon, 1998) or 
personal ethics. In this sense, to be trusted constrains the choices of the trust 
recipient and can be unwelcome. This particular exchange dilemma may be further 
exacerbated, however, because, as we have seen, the act of trusting implies a 
favourable, even admiring assessment of the trust recipient that one would like to 
vindicate for identity (social-identity cues; socio-emotional) reasons. This is 
particularly the case if the giver is a significant valued partner such as a superior or 
esteemed colleague (trust’s particularism).  
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Andrew’s intention to trust Brenda may be positive and genuine, but when 
trust is neither sought nor welcome, it can become a negative experience – a 
poisoned chalice – for the recipient. Unsolicited trust presented in such a way as to 
be difficult to reject may be used to inspire and motivate but, given the status and 
kudos benefits claimed for being trusted, this dark side scenario suggests that the 
trust-giver could also use ‘trust’ in such a way as to create a trap of obligation.  
An organisational example is when managers ‘empower’ under-skilled and/or 
unmotivated employees (Allen et al., 1997). For the under-skilled trust recipient, a 
lack of self-efficacy may mean that empowerment pitches them into decision-making 
beyond her/his capability. Additionally, not all employees may want to be empowered 
(i.e. trusted); in many cases ‘empowerment’ is perceived by recipients as a means of 
increasing their workload and responsibilities without a commensurate pay rise 
(Mabey and Skinner, 1998). Another might be being designated as ‘top talent’, if the 
concomitant expectations for performance and additional responsibilities are 
unattractive and burdensome. A further example would be a supplier given a near-
impossible deadline by a valued customer for whom a refusal to comply would be 
highly damaging to the relationship. If trust is unwanted but accepted, it may lead to 
work intensification and stress (Green, 2004) and forced errors, with knock-on 
repercussions for the trust that was unwanted in the first place. 
Scenario 3: Trust lock-in in long-standing relationships – Alan has placed trust in 
Brian and continues to trust him but Brian no longer wishes this to be the case. 
Our third scenario is an extension of the second, and illustrates the use of long-
standing social exchanges and deep bonds of indebtedness (one party’s power over 
another) to create a ‘trust trap’. The same sequence and logic applies in this scenario 
as in the previous one, but the length of the relationship and the shadow of past 
exchanges intensify the dilemma. Brian’s trust relationship with Alan may have begun 
positively but, over time, being trusted has ceased to be beneficial for Brian. He may 
no longer be able or willing to fulfil what is expected of him because of incapacities or 
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competing demands. He is now a reluctant trust recipient. As such, any pre-existing 
moral or contractual joint agreement may be viewed as a constraint if the terms of the 
deal (and the obligations implied by them) threaten his interests, and the agreement 
is too inflexible to accommodate revisions to the rules of engagement.  
SET suggests that the more powerful the social bond (the deeper the 
investment in trust and the resulting indebtedness), the harder it is to reject it, or to 
act contrary to its implied obligations (Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2004). This 
accounts for the rigidities and lock-in effects which may arise in long-standing and 
successful relationships. In trust scenarios, when its particularistic quality dominates 
the decision, there is a danger of an ‘amplification of reciprocity’ that leads to 
‘structural arthritis’ in relations (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000: 185).  
An organisational example is the fallout from a failed partnership agreement 
between a management team and a trade union. Brian, as a union representative, 
may have reached a ‘line in the sand’ beyond which he cannot reconcile himself to a 
painful concession, such as job losses or a pay freeze, ‘partnership’ obligations 
notwithstanding (see Gall, 2001). The situation of a supplier firm’s long-standing 
contract with a dominant and unreasonable customer (Cox, 2001) is another 
example, as is a failing alliance (Adobor, 2006). In these scenarios, trust’s socio-
emotional and particularistic qualities – once prized and cherished – can become 
problematic and even intolerable.  
Again, the predicament of reneging on a long history of trust is interpersonally 
awkward, and is likely to come as a shock.  The party still trusting might not easily 
decipher the cues of the relationship-retreating party. When the retreating party’s 
change of mind becomes apparent it is likely to be perceived as a breach or, even 
more strongly, as a betrayal, resulting in emotionally-laden and identity-threatening 
negative experiences. Hence, a long history of productive trust exchange can 
become a burden when trust is no longer attractive. The awkward social challenge of 
managing withdrawal from a relationship can lead to ‘commitment escalation’ 
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(McAllister, 1997: 101) on the part of the reluctant trustor. The long-standing ‘trust’ 
obligation may seem the lesser of the two predicaments.  
These scenarios have highlighted how both the social exchange and trust 
literatures assume parties have a vested interest in fulfilling obligations and 
furnishing inducements, to demonstrate their trustworthiness and nurture trust. Yet 
this is not necessarily the case. In his original work Blau saw that social exchange 
principles and dynamics can create pressure to discharge unwelcome obligations. He 
noted, crucially, that failure to comply with obligations can be ‘disadvantageous’ by 
leading to poorer relations, but also reputational damage and guilt for the dissenting 
party (Blau, 1964:.97). Our argument is that this dynamic, based on the norm of 
reciprocity, is present in trust, and can be manipulated to be coercive, creating bonds 
of indebtedness (Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2004), trapping people in unproductive 
but inescapable relationships (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000). What might distinguish a 
positive chain of obligations from a pernicious one is motive.  
The importance of motives. Griffin and O’Leary-Kelly (2004: 5) suggest that the same 
behaviour can be either functional or dysfunctional, ‘depending on intent, motive, 
context and consequences’. As noted earlier the gift-giving literature highlights the 
importance of motives more strongly than the SET literature. Extending this thinking 
to trust highlights further possible poison chalice scenarios which arise from the 
motivation of one or both parties in the relationship. People may baulk at suggestions 
of self-interested intentions being behind trusting interactions, but we have already 
seen in scenario 1 how having to trust someone creates an unbalanced power 
relationship and that those with power may use appeals to be trusted as a means of 
influencing weaker counterparts’ behaviour (Brandts and Charness, 2003), and/or to 
avoid close scrutiny of their actions. We have also seen, with scenarios 2 and 3, how 
being trusted can entrap a wary partner, effecting a similar asymmetric reciprocity 
that, in those two scenarios, underscores the trust-giver’s supremacy.  
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This potential for an asymmetry of power in trust relationships, especially 
those crossing a hierarchical divide (such as employees and their leaders; buyers 
and suppliers), has been underplayed in the literature. However, it is here where 
certain characteristics of trust may become most apparent and most salient. Put 
simply, trust’s symbolic and emotional connotations have the potential to be exploited 
for political manoeuvre, or manipulation, because, as we have argued, to suspect or 
to refuse trust might create all kinds of negative consequences. The identity of the 
focal party – whether as trustee or trustor (i.e. trust’s particularism) – may be a 
decisive factor in facilitating a manipulative ‘trusting’ power-play and the intentions 
behind the trust exchange are critical for the experience of trust.  
Scenario 4: Withdrawn trust – Anouk decides not to continue to trust Bruno. 
In this scenario, a sequence of decisions to trust has come to a deliberate end. 
Anouk’s withdrawal of trust casts powerful negative aspersions on the 
trustworthiness of the now spurned recipient, Bruno, whether in relation to his ability, 
benevolence or integrity, or a combination of all three. Experiencing a trust 
withdrawal might be expected to damage Bruno’s self-image and reputation, and 
even jeopardise his standing in social networks. His distress may come from shame, 
embarrassment and even guilt from being no longer trusted. Losing someone’s trust 
may, therefore, render it a poisoned chalice in retrospect. Examples from 
organisational life include being pulled from an important and high-profile project, 
being passed over for a promotion, or a public sacking. The stigmatisation felt as a 
result of ostentatious new monitoring mechanisms also represents this scenario (for 
example daily appraisals, performance league tables and revised codes of ethical 
conduct for professionals – see O’Neill, 2002). 
Withdrawals of trust may be justifiable, even on explicit trust grounds (due to 
diminished confidence in a focal party’s trustworthiness) but it is a manifestation of 
trust’s dark side when threat of its removal is used as a sanction and a control 
mechanism (Mabey and Skinner, 1998), to secure the trust recipient’s 
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cooperation/submission. An example would be Anouk indicating to Bruno that his 
continued membership of a prestigious team, or even his promotion (both suggestive 
of her ‘trust’ in him) is dependant upon Bruno carrying out certain tasks. As with 
scenarios 1 to 3, this scenario points again to the intriguing potential for trust to serve 
as a control. Moreover, if Bruno considers the tasks demanded of him to be 
untrustworthy acts that he must nevertheless carry out, his discomfort will likely be 
heightened as he now faces scenario 2 (not wanting to be trusted), as well.  
The distress for the no longer trusted party can be especially problematic due 
to the salience of trust’s particularism and status-laden characteristics for the trust 
recipient: if the relationship is important, the consequences of trust’s withdrawal will 
be especially serious. In addition, trust withdrawal conducted publicly is likely to have 
a more deleterious effect; a private withdrawal can be expected to be less traumatic 
than a public humiliation (trust as a ‘status-laden’ commodity).  
Scenario 4 has echoed the valence of being trusted from scenarios 2 and 3. 
Our final scenario looks at the distress that occurs when trust is promised, but not 
delivered. In this scenario trust is insincere: trust is promised, perhaps as an 
incentive, but it is only given in word but not in deed.  
Scenario 5: Insincere trust – Alison expresses trust in Bethany but this is not 
supported by her actions.  
In this scenario, although ‘trust’ is articulated in the form of a professed intent 
by the trust-giver, it is not demonstrated by the risk-taking that is trust’s most 
convincing manifestation. The promised trust never arrives. Or, worse from Bethany’s 
point of view, Alison’s stated intent is accompanied by trust’s opposite, close 
monitoring and tight control: ‘If you [truly] trust a partner, you do not need to verify 
[i.e. check up on them]. Doing so would be the clearest indication that you do not 
trust [them]’ (Schoorman et al., 2007: 350). The prospect of being trusted, particularly 
if it is something sought after, and especially from a valued counterpart (trust’s 
status-laden value), means that its denial in practice renders that initially declared 
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trust a poisoned chalice, because of the implicit aspersions that its denial casts on 
one’s character, or competence and the frustrations which are inherent in the 
situation. 
Micro-management is the most obvious, and commonplace, example (Wright, 
2000), such as an autonomous project leader (Bethany) to whom responsibility has 
supposedly been delegated who must nevertheless report back to her manager 
(Alison) prior to any major decision. Bethany’s autonomy is a chimera, as she has 
been given no real power; she is not really trusted. Another example would be a 
superficial empowerment scheme that tolerates employee discretion in trivialities but 
debars their input into more substantial workplace and strategic concerns. The trust 
implied in empowerment is negated by the subsequent lack of risk-taking. A common 
tension point for trust comes with organisations’ legal and compliance procedures 
(O’Neill, 2002): an employer may say it trusts its employees, but the onerous 
stipulations of its compliance regime suggest otherwise.  
Based on these last two scenarios, and given trust’s socio-emotional and 
identity-communicating functions, the the refusal to ‘walk the talk, to follow-up on the 
promise of trust, is likely to invoke strong negative reactions on the side of the (non-) 
trust recipient. Indeed, Kickul and co-authors (2001) have shown that employees 
react most strongly when when they are promised autonomy and empowerment, but 
perceive that these promises are not enacted. Brockner and Siegel (1996) found that 
individuals with high organisational commitment react more harshly to their 
employer’s broken promises than those with low commitment, because the former 
perceive the unfairness as an identity-threat. 
Yet, we also see this scenario being problematic for the trustor (Alison). 
Taking the empowerment example, the fear of poor employee input has been cited 
as one reason why line managers find empowerment of their direct reports such a 
threat (Spreitzer and Mishra, 1999). Trusting her subordinates may be perceived by 
Alison as an unacceptable risk and even a challenge to her self-image as an 
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experienced and qualified manager responsible for taking the organisation’s 
decisions. She may view trusting staff as a threat to her managerial status and even 
her job security (Batt, 2004). However, if Alison says that she has confidence in 
Bethany but fails to act upon it, the disconnect between her word and deed damages 
Alison’s integrity (Simons, 2002).  
This particular scenario goes to the heart of the debate about whether trust 
and risk-taking acts are distinct, though related, phenomena (as with Mayer et al., 
1995) or whether risk-taking is the only credible demonstration of trust and hence its 
definitional realisation (Schoorman, et al., 2007). This scenario – of insincere trust 
being unsettling, even demoralising for the recipient – neatly encapsulates the 
argument in favour of the latter. Trust cannot only be viewed as a ‘psychological 
state’, as per Rousseau and colleagues’ (1998) widely used definition. The act is real 
trust, not the stated willingness to trust.  
This scenario also highlights the relationship between trust and forms of 
control such as monitoring, or contractual protections (Weibel, 2007). While the 
scenario might appear to support the substitution thesis of an inverse relationship 
between trust and control (the institution of governance mechanisms is seen as 
informed by suspicion and hence is inimical to trust), we believe it suggests instead 
that controls which obviate any risk for the trust-giver may be unwelcome, and may 
render talk of ‘trust’ hypocritical.  However, some forms of control may be acceptable 
(the complementarity thesis). Indeed, the bulk of the available evidence suggests that 
trust and control can work as complements rather than substitutes (Costa and 
Bijlsma-Frankema, 2007): you can have both (trust based on controls, or acceptance 
of controls because of the presence of trust). Bethany may accept some monitoring 
of her work, if it is reasonable; indeed, she may see checks and balances as 
indicative of Alison’s competence and of her genuine interest and care. But she is 
likely to resent punishment-oriented, or suspicious, control when she is supposedly 
trusted. This suggests that the content of the controls, the intent behind the controls, 
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and the trustee’s consent to the controls, are all decisive moderators of this 
relationship (Das and Teng, 2001). 
 
The Research Agenda. 
If we understand the process of trust to be one which is inherently relational 
and involves a series of exchanges then the ideas found in the social exchange and 
gift-giving theory offer a useful lens through which to extend our understanding of its 
nature. These literatures explore the complexities of a dark side to social exchanges 
and it seems unlikely to us that trust would be exempt from this aspect of human 
interaction. Accepting this potential allows us to challenge the apparent truism that 
trust is always, in and of itself, something which is good and desirable. We believe 
that this truism limits our ability to understand the full nature and complexities of trust. 
In our analysis of trust’s dark side we have identified some of the conditions under 
which trust is a welcome and positive experience, and more importantly for our 
purposes, when it has the potential to be unwelcome and negative. It is widely 
assumed in the trust literature that evidence of Mayer et al’s (1995) three 
trustworthiness attributes (ability, benevolence, integrity) or Whitener et al.’s (1998) 
five categories of trustworthy behaviour (consistency, integrity, sharing and 
delegation of control, communication, and benevolence) are sufficient to foster ‘real’ 
trust. The conventional view of trust’s ‘dark side’ follows from this: it only arises when 
this assessment is misjudged. Our essential argument is that the default assumptions 
in the trust literature of benign motives, welcome obligations and productive 
reciprocity, do not cover all trusting scenarios. We do not deny that purely positive 
trust experiences are possible but there are also those trust experiences that can 
result in an unwelcome burden and which may stem from less than benign intent. In 
our illustrative trust scenarios we have suggested ways in which trusting interactions 
could generate obligations that are unwelcome for the focal party, harbouring 
potentially negative consequences. These are trust’s ‘poisoned chalice’ scenarios 
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and the possibility of such experiences highlights the need for new directions in trust 
research if we are to fully understand this very complex aspect of human interaction 
within organisations 
We need to understand precisely what is being exchanged when parties trust 
each other, how the process unfolds and how cues are recognised and interpreted. 
SET suggests that trust is symbolic, status-laden, socio-emotional, intangible and 
particularistic, and we have argued that these characteristics embody trust’s innate 
value but therein also lies the potential for trust to be a poison chalice. A dominant 
assumption about trust is that parties must share mutually positive outcomes in trust-
based relations. Though most trusting interactions are likely to be honest and 
sincere, our analysis has shown that this assumption masks the full range of interests 
and intentions involved. The social pressures innate to the trust experience, as well 
as the difficulties in assessing others’ trustworthiness accurately, creates the 
possibility that the process of trust could be used for deception. This echoes a 
conclusion reached by Brenkert (1998b: p. 281): ‘the tendency... to equate trust and 
morality must be rejected’ Neither being trusted nor trusting is always benign. Nor 
does trust always leads to positive consequences for all parties involved. Returning 
to Blau’s two motives for social exchange, our scenarios illustrate either misjudged 
efforts to realise a positive relationship (a ‘friendship in Blau’s terms) which could 
conform to the conventional depiction of the dark side or deliberate attempts to 
achieve super-ordination using the dynamics and/ or the language of trust.   
This suggests a number of fruitful areas for research including how people 
actually process cues of trustworthiness; how they understand and interpret both 
trust related language and actions and the importance of the context in which these 
take place.  Repeated over time, trust exchanges create a cycle of obligations to be 
fulfilled (Whitener et al., 1998). The gradual expansion of exchanges that have 
intrinsic and/or extrinsic appeal for both parties becomes motivationally self-
enforcing, binding trust giver and trust recipient together (Pettit, 1995). Yet, for trust 
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to develop, both parties must abide by certain rules which serve as the ‘guidelines of 
exchange processes’ (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005: 875). However, these 
guidelines are vague and ill-defined for general exchange processes, and the 
problem with trust is that its rules are not at all obvious. There is little agreement on 
the established rules and criterion that govern such social exchange interactions. It is  
likely that economic logic cannot be applied to social exchanges and that there are 
different rules for the exchange of different resources; love is exchanged differently to 
money. Nor do we understand the time-frame for trust’s reciprocity other than to 
know it is not uniform but is contingent on the context and the relationship, indeed 
some argue that ‘for trust to develop the recipient should not reciprocate hastily’ 
(Shore et al, 2009: 290) but is this always true or only true in certain circumstances? 
There is a need to better understand the ‘rules’ that individuals and social groups 
operate, whether consciously or unconsciously, in the context of trust exchanges. 
The SET and gift giving literature note the role of social expectation and the 
additional pressures associated with exchanges which occur in public. Intuitively we 
would expect the same to be true of trust exchanges.  The power balance within the 
employment relationship is another important contextual factor which has received 
limited consideration in relation to trust but is one which is of particular interest not 
only in exploration of the factors which lead to an assessment of trustworthiness but 
also the potential to contribute to the creation of a poison chalice experience.  
The second area for research relates to the motives which lie beneath these 
exchanges and the scope for manipulation. While the widespread agreement in the 
literature is that trust can neither be mandated nor bought (Gambetta, 1988), we 
question whether this assumption is correct. Trust based on positive well-intentioned 
confidence in another has the potential to result in a negative experience, perhaps 
because it is misplaced or not desired by the recipient, but we also believe that there 
is the potential for trust to be consciously used to manipulate both individuals and 
situations. Manipulation is defined as a compilation of three features: some sort of 
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advantage accrues to the manipulator (Porter et al., 1981; Schminke, 1998); a 
deception is used such that those being influenced are not consciously aware of the 
attempt to control them and, finally, the manipulator’s motive is to change the other 
party’s behaviour to achieve the manipulator’s own objectives (Green & Pawlak, 
1983; Wrong, 1988). Manipulation often comes in the form of tactics related to the 
use and availability of information and creation of favourable images (Allen et al., 
1979). Deception is typically accomplished by a controlled distortion of the perception 
of reality (Porter et al., 1981). Social exchange resources “cannot be bartered lest 
their value as genuine feelings or judgements be compromised” (Blau, 1964: p.96). 
So deceivers have to rely on the language of trust to hide their intent however, the 
discourse of trust – how the word is used in social interactions – is an under-explored 
and potentially significant research agenda. Invocations of trust could be used as 
linguistic ‘smoke and mirrors’ to create the unwelcome obligations or inferences that 
compel another to act against their own interests in the pursuit of trust. In other 
words, the very language of trust may contain within it a sinister potential as 
deliberately engineered performative acts (see, for example, Hodgson, 2005). 
Several of the illustrative scenarios depict controlled distortions of the notion of trust, 
whether by constraining a reluctant trust recipient’s options within trust parameters 
set for the trust donor’s benefit (scenarios 1, 2, 5), or by compelling a reluctant trust 
recipient to trust despite their better judgement (scenario 3). We stress, however, that 
this is not the case for all scenarios, some may be unintentional. So, while each of 
the poisoned chalice trust exchanges are nominally reciprocal in that trust is being 
exchanged, what distinguishes genuine reciprocity and genuine trust might be the 
motives and intentions behind the exchange.  
Our understanding of trust as we have explained it here includes the 
fundamental importance of the risk-taking act for trust. This tends to be considered 
separate to the trust process itself (Mayer et al., 1995: p.724), but in our opinion is its 
natural manifestation; (Schoorman et al., 2007). As illustrated in the fifth scenario 
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trustworthiness beliefs and a willingness to be vulnerable may be superficial, even 
hypocritical, without the act of taking a risk. The intention to trust may not be carried 
through, and hence not be experienced as trust; worse, intent alone can be re-cast 
as distrust without an accompanying risk-taking act. In short, understanding trust as 
the three-stage process we believe that it is requires that the risk-tasking act receives 
more attention. This has major implications for the design of empirical studies. 
Measures of trust should incorporate risk-taking acts (Dietz & den Hartog, 2006), 
whether by proxy (e.g. manifest in a decision), or from the creation of a new measure 
of trust as a behaviour, similar to that for organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB).  
 
Conclusion. 
It is our belief that it is time to challenge the rather glib, ‘monochromatic’ 
optimism (Sievers, 2003: 360) that dominates most literatures on trust such that trust 
is widely considered to be inherently a good thing, almost untouchably so. In this 
paper we have explained why this state of affairs is limiting and have called for a 
wider exploration of dark side behaviours in the realm of what Sievers called ‘one of 
the few white spots [i.e. untarnished – sic] left on the organisational map’ (2003: 
358). In doing so our intention is to provoke both debate and challenge and to begin 
the development of a research agenda which seeks to better understand the dark 
potential we see in the complexities of trust. 
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